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This paper documents that changes in assortative mating patterns over the last four decades 
along the dimensions of age, ethnicity and religion are not responsible for the increasing 
marital stability in Austria. Quite the contrary, without the rise in the age at marriage, divorce 
rates would be considerably higher. Immigration and secularization, and the resulting supply 
of spouses with diverse ethnicity and religious denominations had no overall effect on divorce 
rates. Countervailing effects – in line with theoretical predictions – offset each other. The rise 
in the incidence in divorce is most probably caused by changing social norms. 
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The family in the western world has undergone radical changes over the last decades.
Among these the increasing incidence of divorce which could be observed in most countries
is often considered the most dramatic and the most far-reaching change (Amato, 2000).1
A large body of research across academic disciplines has documented a strong negative
correlation between divorce and a wide range of outcomes.2 Compared with married indi-
viduals, divorced individuals have lower levels of economic well-being and do worse along
many psychological (e.g. Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2004) and health dimensions. Policy-
makers and scholars are especially concerned about negative consequences of divorce for
aﬀected children. Many papers consistently show that children of divorced parents in vari-
ous ways tend to fare worse compared to children from continuously married parents.3 For
instance, Gruber (2004) ﬁnds that they have lower educational attainment, lower incomes,
marry earlier but separate more often, and have higher odds to commit suicide.
The potential negative consequences of divorce have spurred eﬀort to identify the causes
for (increased) marital instability. However, since the dramatic increase in divorce rates
came along with an increased economic independence of women and radical changes in
divorce law the causal link between demographic, economic and legal changes is non-trivial.
So far, the economic literature has focused on changes in divorce law (Peters, 1986; Allen,
1992; Peters, 1992; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). These papers exploiting variation
across U.S. states have furthered our understanding of the eﬀect of divorce law on intra-
household-bargaining and explained part of the changes in family formation, dissolution
and behavior within marriage over the last decades. However, a large part of the changing
divorce behavior over time is still unexplained.
Another strand of literature – more interested in personal behavior – analyzes whether
certain combinations of spouses’ characteristics can explain the likelihood of divorce. This
question can be directly linked to economic theory, which regards marriage as a volun-
tary partnership for the purpose of joint production and joint consumption. The so-called
marriage market determines the assignment of partners and the sharing of the gains of
marriage (Becker, 1973, 1974, 1993). Traditionally, economists have emphasized the im-
portance of joint production and have shown that an eﬃcient marriage market is usually
characterized by the match of spouses with similar characteristics. This so-called positive
assortative mating enhances complementarities in household production and may reinforce
1In 2005, the crude divorce rate was – averaged across OECD-member countries – 2:1 per 1;000 people,
twice the level recorded in 1970 and 0:2 points higher than in 2000. These ﬁgures turn out to be even more
pronounced if one considers that most of these countries experienced declining marriage rates during that
period. In 2005, the crude marriage rate was on average 5:3 per 1;000 people, which is more than a third
less than the level recorded in 1970 (OECD, 2009).
2For a survey on the research conducted in the 1980s and 1990s see Kitson and Morgan (1990) and
Amato (2000), respectively.
3While many of these studies look at correlations and thus cannot convincingly establish a true causal
eﬀect of divorce – because confounding factors that promote divorce may also be detrimental to the
outcomes under consideration – a small number of promising studies has exploited natural experiments
(Bedard and Deschenes, 2005; Björklund and Sundström, 2006; Ananat and Michaels, 2008) and gives
diversiﬁed results.
2the intergenerational persistence of wealth, income, education, and other economic out-
comes.4 Sociologist (e.g. Kalmijn, 1998) refer to the matching of homogenous spouses as
endogamy (marriage to the same type) or homogamy (marriage to a similar type). They
study it in order to understand important social processes, such as the family’s ability to
pass on group values, or more generally, since it reveals how societies change over time.
Scholars in both disciplines have focused on three dimensions of spouses’ characteristics:
(i) age, (ii) ethnicity and (iii) religious denomination.5 As predicted by theory (Becker,
Landes and Michael, 1977) a vast empirical literature has shown that assortative mating
along these dimensions is important for a successful duration of a marriage. A higher age
at ﬁrst marriage is known to decrease the likelihood of divorce and diﬀerences in religion
and ethnicity are associated with a higher risk of divorce (e.g. Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993;
Kalmijn, de Graaf and Janssen, 2005).
Others have looked at changes in assortative mating patterns over time.6 Most recently,
Rosenfeld (2008) concludes that racial endogamy has declined sharply over the 20th cen-
tury. Nevertheless, race is still the most powerful division in the U.S.-marriage market.
The development of religious endogamy is diverse; while the division between Jews and
Christians is still strong, the division between Catholics and Protestants has weakened
over time. Finally, a sharp rise in the age at ﬁrst marriage can be observed.7
Despite the fact that pronounced changes in marriage patterns over time are docu-
mented, surprisingly no research on their impact on the incidence of divorce over time has
been conducted. This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to examine whether the increased marital
instability is driven by changing assortative mating patterns over time. To this end, we em-
ploy Austrian Register Data. Our choice can be rationalized by two facts: (i) this unique
data-set covers the universe of all marriages and divorces in Austria between 1971 and
2007, and (ii) the Austrian marriage market has been radically aﬀected by several waves of
labor immigration, that have increased the incidence of both mixed religious and/or ethnic
marriages. Furthermore, the sustained secularization of the native (traditionally Catholic)
Austrian society has further altered the distribution of spouses’ religious denominations.
In addition, the rise in the age at ﬁrst marriage has been pronounced in Austria. Since we
observe all marriages formed over a period of four decades, we can analyze the patterns
and changes of assortative mating over a longer period of time, and are able to assess their
contributions to the rise in divorce rates. Moreover, our data allow us to examine the
stability of the diﬀerent dimensions of assortative mating on the risk of divorce over time.
It turns out that changes in assortative mating do not contribute to the rising divorce
4Positive assortative mating applies to all personal characteristics which are complements in household
production (e.g. education, intelligence and physical attractiveness), while negative assortative mating
would be optimal for substitutes, such as wage earning power (Becker, 1974).
5We do not concentrate here on education, because we cannot observe it at the time of marriage in our
data set.
6Most of the literature focuses on the U.S., see Kalmijn (1991b,a, 1993, 1994); Pencavel (1998); Smits,
Ultee and Lammers (2000); Schwartz and Mare (2005); Bodenhorn (2006); Gullickson (2006)
7Among OECD-member countries the average age of women at ﬁrst marriage has increased from 24:8
years in 1990 to 27:7 in 2002=2003 (OECD, 2007).
3rate. Neither immigration nor secularization are responsible for the upward trend in di-
vorce. This outcome is the net-result of two countervailing eﬀects: Mixed couples have
(compared to a homogenous native couple) a higher risk of divorce, which is oﬀset by a
lower divorce hazard of homogenous non-native couples. In the case of age at marriage,
we even observe that if spouses would have continued to marry at a young age, divorce
rates would have increased more sharply. Most of these eﬀects change in size over time.
For instance, the destabilizing eﬀect of mixed ethnic couples has tremendously increased,
and the stabilizing eﬀect of a higher age has somewhat decreased over time. We oﬀer some
possible explanations for these trends. Finally, we provide some evidence based on survey
data that the rising trend in divorce may be the results of changing social norms.
2 Data and estimation strategy
Over the last decades the incidence of divorce has increased sharply throughout the western
world. Yet considerable variation in the base level and the pace in the increase in divorce
rates can be observed across countries, see Figure 1. Southern European countries such as
Italy or Spain, which traditionally have had very low levels of divorce rates experienced
the strongest increase. In fact, in both countries divorce has been legalized rather recently
(Italy: 1971, Spain: 1982). Austria, similar to other Central European countries (e.g.
Germany), shows a middle ranking among OECD-member countries and exhibits a divorce
rate which is on average four times higher compared to the south of Europe. Scandinavian
countries (e.g. Sweden) and Great Britain used to have slightly higher rates, but they
have been converging to Central European levels recently. The U.S. has by far the highest
divorce rates in the world and shows exceptional patterns over time. U.S.-divorce rates
rose sharply starting in the mid-1960s, peaked in the early 1980s and have been declining
since then.8
In this paper we focus on Austria, where the quality of the available data is exceptional.9
We combine data from the Austrian Marriage Register, covering all marriages from 1971
to 2007, with the Austrian Divorce Register, covering all divorces for the same time period.
Our sample is based on all 1:646;091 marriages which took place between 1971 and 2007.
The marriage register includes information on the date of marriage, the spouses’ former
family status, place of residence, age at marriage, religious denomination and ethnicity.
Since 1984 information on the spouses’ country of birth and the number, age and sex of
any premarital children is also recorded. We complement our data set with information on
community size and the distance between communities (of husband and wife) measured in
8This downturn can partly be explained by the decline in the incidence of marriage but is also due
to greater marital stability of younger cohorts (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a). The share of the U.S.-
population which is divorced, however, continued to rise through the 1980s and 1990s and has only recently
begun to decrease (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007b).
9Surprisingly, these data have not been used on a micro-level so far. In general, research on divorce in
Austria is scarce, and exists almost exclusively as a part of cross-national studies using survey data such
as the Family and Fertility Survey. The only exceptions we are aware of are Diekmann and Mitter (1984);
Prioux (1992, 1993).
4hours.10 For our estimation we use 1:585;480 marriages. From these marriages, 358;114
got divorced by the end of 2007.11
In order to examine the eﬀect of assortative mating on the probability of divorce over
time we present non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates to get a ﬁrst picture of changes
in marital stability over time. Subsequently, to analyze the contributions of assortative
mating on the duration of marriage we use Cox (proportional hazard) models (Cox, 1972).
In such a model, the hazard rate at time t – i.e. the risk that a marriage dissolves at time
t, provided it lasted that long – is explained by a non-parametric baseline hazard h0(t)





A Cox model is ﬂexible, because the baseline hazard remains unspeciﬁed. Our results
are presented as hazard ratios that is the hazard rate of spouses with characteristics X
relative to the hazard rate of the base group X,
h(tjX)
h(tjX) .
We use the most important dimensions of assortative mating, with the exception of
socio-economic status/education. In particular, we look at age, ethnicity and religious
denomination. We consider the eﬀect of the spouses’ age, as well as the importance of the
spouses’ age diﬀerence. To study ethnicity we ﬁrst run a simple speciﬁcation (covering the
years 1971 through 2007) where we utilize the information on citizenship only. In a further
step we also exploit information on the country of birth (available since 1984), which ﬁnally
gives us nine diﬀerent combinations relative to our base group. Given the Austrian institu-
tional setting this allows us to draw conclusions about the eﬀects of intermarriage among
natives, ﬁrst and further generation immigrants – as well as the impact of naturalization
of foreign-born persons. With respect to religious denomination we diﬀerentiate between
the three quantitatively most important religious aﬃliations in Austria: Catholic (73:6
percent), no religious denomination (12:0 percent) and others (14:4 percent).12 This gives
rise to six possible combinations, where the marriage between two Catholics will serve as
the base group.
As additional control variables we only include exogenous factors (i.e. pre-determined
at the time of marriage): the number of pre-marital female and male children, size of the
spouses’ communities (at the time of marriage), the distance between the two communities
10The information on community size before 2002 is based on the decennial Austrian Census from 1971
to 2001, where we imputed for the missing years by linear interpolation. From 2002 onwards yearly data
is derived from the newly launched electronic Austrian Population Register. Driving distance between
communities comes from the Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning.
11We lose 844 observations, which were not uniquely identiﬁed with respect to birthdays and marriage
date of the spouses, and 40 observations, which took place on the last day of our observation period.
Furthermore we have to disregard 60;611 marriages due to missing information on the spouses’ communities
and/or on the distance between communities. The lack of information is due to changes in the composition
of communities, which took mainly place between 1971 and 1973.
12The other denominations were (Austrian Census from 2001) 4:7 percent Protestants, 4:2 percent
Muslims, 0:2 percent Old Catholics, 0:1 percent Jewish, 3:2 percent with another religious denomination,
and 2:0 percent with missing information.
5(in hours), as well as month and 115 district ﬁxed-eﬀects. It can be argued that all other
factors which might also have an important impact on divorce risk are endogenous with
respect to the viability of the marriage: e.g. the number of post-marital children, labor
supply of either partner or marital satisfaction. If the quality of the marriage is bad and
the risk of divorce is relatively high, it can be expected that both partners might invest less
in marriage-speciﬁc capital, like joint children or joint enterprises of any kind, and that
specialization in the household might be diﬀerent with corresponding changes in labor
supply. For these reasons we refrain from using such potentially endogenous regressors.
Administrative data allow us to actually measure the three dimensions of assortative
mating at the time of marriage. It is well known that spouses become more alike during
marriage – i.e. partners may change religious denomination (Glenn, 1982) or get a new
citizenship. Using retrospective or current information about these characteristics might
therefore overestimate the degree of endogamy.
3 Estimation results
We perform two diﬀerent speciﬁcations – for the whole period (1971-2007) and a sub-
period (1984-2007) – where we distinguish between ﬁrst and further marriages each. First
marriages are couples where both spouses are in their ﬁrst marriage. All other marriages
are denoted as further marriages. Approximately 72 percent of all marriages are ﬁrst
marriages. In a further step we estimate separate models for each decade. This allows us
to test if the eﬀect of the diﬀerent dimensions of assortative mating has changed over time.
3.1 Assortative mating and the increasing marital instability
The Kaplan-Meier estimates for ﬁrst (Figure 2) and further marriages (Figure 3) show
survival probabilities for marriages formed in the decades from the 1970s to the 2000s. Both
for ﬁrst as well as further marriages we see monotonically declining survival probabilities
over time. For instance, 84 percent of marriages formed in the 1970s are still intact after
15 years, this value is only 77 percent for marriages formed in the 1990s. The pattern is
similar for further marriages; albeit at a lower level. 13
In order to estimate how the likelihood of divorces would have evolved over time if
assortative mating patterns would not have changed, we start with a parsimonious model
and enrich it stepwise. Columns (Ia) and (IIa) in Table 1 replicate the descriptive life-
tables by only including dummies for the diﬀerent decades in a Cox model – along with
district dummies. In case of ﬁrst marriages (Ia) shows that marriages formed in the 1980s
have a 31:9 percent higher risk of divorce – compared to marriages in the 1970s, our base
group. The equivalent values for marriages formed in the 1990s and in the 2000s are equal
13As expected, the probability of divorce is higher for further marriages compared to ﬁrst marriages.
This can be explained by the fact that spouses in second marriages are not randomly selected (i.e. they
have a higher inherent divorce propensity) and marital-speciﬁc investments (e.g. children) from former
marriages lower the gain from subsequent marriages (Becker et al., 1977).
6to 47:0 percent and 48:6 percent, respectively. Thus, we mainly see an increase in divorce
risk in the 1980s and somewhat less in the 1990s. A similar development can be observed
for further marriages, see Column (IIa), but here the increase in divorce risk is smoother
over time.
We are interested to see if developments in assortative mating can explain (part of)
the trend towards higher divorce rates over time in Austria. When looking at the three
dimensions of assortative mating – age, ethnicity and religion – it turns out that only
age really matters. Changes over time both in ethnicity and religion aﬀect the trend in
marriages only marginally. We therefore introduce in a ﬁrst step the eﬀect of age and
age diﬀerence at the time of marriage in our Columns (Ib) and (IIb) and include all other
variables together in Columns (Ic) and (IIc).14
During the last decades, Austria witnessed a sharp increase in the age at ﬁrst marriage,
see Figure 4. While in the 1970s, the average age at ﬁrst marriage was 21:6 for women
and 24:5 for men, in the 1990s it had increased to 22:9 for women and 25:4 for men. By
2007, the average age at marriage had reached 28:8 for women and 31:6 for men. In the
period from 1970 to 2007 husbands were on average 2:6 years older than their wives. The
variation in the diﬀerence in age was less pronounced over time, see Figure 4. However,
one could observe a modest decrease starting in the mid 1970s until the mid 1990s, and
an equivalent increase thereafter.
Partialing out the eﬀects of age and age diﬀerence at the time of marriage in Columns
(Ib) and (IIb) we see that divorce risk would have increased even more sharply in the
absence of these trends. For ﬁrst marriages the decade eﬀects would have increased to 45:0
percent (the 1980s), 93:3 percent (the 1990:) and 126:8 percent (the 2000s). Therefore,
compared to the eﬀects estimated above, divorce hazards in the 1990s have doubled and
those in the 2000s even have tripled. This pattern is similar for further marriages: taking
age (diﬀerences) into account increases the rising trend in marriage dissolution. A simula-
tion in Figure 5 illustrates how divorce rates would have evolved if the age of the wife at
her ﬁrst marriage would have been constant to its level in 1970.
Accordingly, we ﬁnd that an increase of the wife’s age at the time of ﬁrst marriage (a
further marriage) by one year leads to a reduction in the risk of divorce by 10:0 percent
(6:5 percent). Lehrer (2008) explains this phenomenon by the so-called maturity eﬀect,
describing that individuals marrying relatively young are less informed about themselves,
their spouses, and the marriage market. On the other hand, a larger age diﬀerence between
the spouses is – within some limits – beneﬁcial for the stability of the marriage. Ideally,
the husband is about ten years older than the wife.
In a further step we study the impact of ethnicity. Austria’s post-World War II eco-
14In the case of ﬁrst marriages the divorce rate would be marginally lower in the absence of changing
assortative mating along the dimensions of ethnicity and religion. The same is true for further marriages in
the case of religion. The only mentionable exception is the impact of the dimension of ethnicity in the case
of further marriages. Divorce risk would have been somewhat lower in the absence of immigration; details
are provided below. All results from estimations where we introduce our diﬀerent measures of assortative
mating step-by-step are available upon request.
7nomic boom led to several waves of labor immigration. While in 1961 only 1:4 percent
of the resident population where foreign citizens, this share has doubled by 1971, steadily
increased over time and amounted to 6:6 percent in 2001. The two main recruitment re-
gions were former Yugoslavia and Turkey. Though active labor recruitment was stopped
by the late 1980s it had clearly lasting eﬀects on subsequent migration inﬂows (e.g. due to
the political crisis in the disintegrating Yugoslavia in the early 1990s) and on the current
composition of the foreign resident population in Austria. In 2001, 63:2 percent of the total
foreign resident population came from former Yugoslavia (45:3 percent) and Turkey (17:9
percent). Other important immigrant groups were Germans (10:2 percent) and Asians (4:9
percent). These immigration ﬂows had a clear impact on the Austrian marriage market.
While in 1971 94:1 percent of all marrying couples consisted of two Austrians spouses, this
number decreased over time (see Figure 6), and was equal to 76:9 percent in 2007. Couples
with one foreign and one native spouse accounted for 18:2 percent, and the remaining 4:9
percent were marriages between two foreigners. To study the impact of inter-ethnic mar-
riages we start with a simple speciﬁcation where we distinguish between couples, where the
wife is a foreign citizen, the husband is a foreigner, or where both spouses are foreigners
and compare them with the hazard of two Austrian spouses. As said before, the rising
participation of foreigners on the Austrian marriage market has had only negligible eﬀects
on the decade eﬀects of ﬁrst marriages, and is therefore not responsible for the increasing
incidence of divorce overt time. In the case of further marriages we ﬁnd some eﬀects. In the
absence of immigration, the actual decade eﬀects in Columns (IIa) would have decreased to
13:9 percent (the 1980s), 18:5 percent (the 1990:) and 26:2 percent (the 2000s). Detailed
output is available on request.
In substance, our results corroborate what theory predicts and conﬁrm earlier studies
(Kalmijn, de Graaf and Janssen, 2005). A discrepancy between the spouses’ ethnic back-
ground increases the probability of divorce. This can be explained by lower gains from
marriage (Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977). For instance in the case of ﬁrst marriages,
compared to an Austrian couple, a mixed couple has, depending on whether the wife or
the husband is a foreign citizen, a 25:6 or 42:6 percent higher risk of divorce. On the other
hand, a couple, where both spouses are foreigners, has (compared to a native couple) a 60:9
percent lower risk of dissolution. This is in line with what one would expect on the basis
of more traditional value orientation among Yugoslav and Turkish citizens. It seems that
these two countervailing eﬀects – the larger divorce risk of mixed couples and the lower
divorce risk of a foreign couple – are almost balanced, and in sum we observe no overall
impact of immigration on marital stability in Austria over time.
Two developments have changed the distribution of religious denominations in Austria.
Firstly, the outlined waves of (labor) immigration have increased the share of residents with
religious aﬃliations other than Roman Catholic. Most importantly, almost all immigrants
from Turkey and a large share of those from former Yugoslavia are Muslims. While in 1971
only 0:3 percent of the population of Austria were Muslim, this pattern has increased over
time and amounted to 4:2 percent in 2001. Secondly, due to a high degree of seculariza-
8tion the share of Roman Catholics (1971: 87:4 percent, 2001: 73:6 percent) decreased in
favor of residents without any religious aﬃliation (1971: 4:3 percent, 2001: 12:0 percent).
Accordingly, we observe a changing composition of spouses over time (see Figure 7).
Changes in religious composition as well as the increasing prevalence of mixed-religion
couples cannot explain the rising trend in divorce rates. Again, countervailing eﬀects are
almost balanced and in sum we observe no overall impact of changes in religious composi-
tion on marital stability over time. Persons who marry outside of their religion are much
more likely to dissolve the marriage. Again, this is in line with theory and previous studies
(Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993). Compared to the base group (a catholic couple), a marriage
between a catholic spouse and a spouse with a diﬀerent (or without any) denomination has
a 26:1 percent (or 44:2 percent) higher divorce risk. Marriages between spouses where one
spouse belongs to another denomination (predominantly muslim) and the other is without
any denomination have the highest risk to end in divorce (plus 45:2 percent). Marriages
between spouses without any religion are also less stable (plus 26:5 percent). Marriages
between spouses who both belong to another denomination (predominantly muslim) are
the most stable (minus 17:8 percent). This might be due to a stability-increasing inﬂuence
of religion on family life.
Our additional control variables show consistent results across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
The larger the spouses’ communities of residence (at the time of marriage) the higher the
risk of divorce. This may show diﬀerent family values or higher social stigma of divorce
in rural areas as compared to large cities. The distance between the spouses’ communities
is also a signiﬁcant predictor of divorce. An additional hour reduces the probability of
divorce in a ﬁrst marriage by 1:3 percent.
There is a clear seasonal pattern of marital stability which is most likely due to selec-
tion eﬀects and can’t be interpreted causally: Marriages formed in May are by far most
stable, followed by those formed in April and June. In fact, the merry month of May has
traditionally always been the preferred month to marry; in particular for those couples
who plan well in advance and arrange larger marriage ceremonies. At the other extreme
are marriages formed in December whose hazard of divorce is more than twenty percent
higher as the hazard of May marriages. The catholic church was and is quite reluctant
to arrange marriages during the pre-Christmas season. Therefore, couples wedding in De-
cember might either be less religious or it might be an indication of a shot-gun marriage.
Again, as expected, calendar eﬀects are much less pronounced for second marriages.
Summarizing we see a clear downward trend in marital stability in Austria across the
last four decades; this trend is only intensiﬁed if we take changes in assortative mating
over time into account.
3.2 Ethnicity and country of birth
For marriages after 1983 the country of birth of the spouses is available. In the previous
estimations we could only observe citizenship of the spouses; due to the possibility of
9naturalization, this speciﬁcation would mix up Austrian-born individuals with foreign-born
immigrants who already got an Austrian citizenship. With this additional information we
can now distinguish between four types of individuals, which give rise to ten diﬀerent
pairings that allow us to look at ethnicity and origin of birth separately, and to distinguish
between natives, ﬁrst and second generation immigrants.15
Therefore, we rerun our analysis with this more elaborate speciﬁcation of ethnical
background and include also some additional control variables. As before, we use two
native Austrians as our base group. Looking at Table 2, this speciﬁcation conﬁrms the
basic results from above, and provides further insights. Again, we ﬁnd that the rising
share of spouses with migration background had no overall impact on long-run divorce
trends and homogenous couples have a lower divorce risk compared to mixed ones. Table
3 re-arranges the results to highlight the added value of this speciﬁcation. Relative to
the base group, we see that couples with a joint migration background do fare better in
terms of marriage stability, whereas those of a mixed background do fare worse.16 Within
immigrants, those ‘closer’ to the Austrian society – either those in the second generation
or those having gained Austrian nationality over time – are also closer to the Austrians
in terms of marital stability: we see that the lowest divorce risk is encountered by ﬁrst
generation immigrants without Austrian citizenship (minus 60:3 percent). Among mixed
couples, consisting of a native Austrian and an immigrant, the more dissimilar they are,
the higher their relative divorce risk; a native Austrian and a ﬁrst generation immigrant
without Austrian citizenship have the highest likelihood of divorce (plus 48:1 percent). For
further marriages, we observe quite similar qualitative and quantitative eﬀects.
Further control variables in Table 2 concern the impact of pre-marital joint children
and the impact of previous marriages (in the case of further marriages). We ﬁnd that
pre-marital children increase the divorce risk of ﬁrst marriages, while they stabilize further
marriages. In the case of ﬁrst marriages, the eﬀect is however only statistically signiﬁcant
for female pre-marital children (plus 3:4 percent per child). In the next section we show that
it is decisive to allow for parameter changes over time in order to resolve this discrepancy.
In the case of further marriages we can distinguish if only one or already both spouses are
in their second union. As expected, the highest divorce risk is observed for cases where
both spouses have already married before (base group). In the case, where only one spouses
was married before, the marriage is less stable, if this was the wife. This is plausible, since
in the presence of children usually mothers are assigned custody, which lowers the gains of
subsequent marriages. Finally, it should be noted that our results are robust to controlling
15In particular, we distinguish between a native Austrian (born in Austria, Austrian citizenship), a second
generation immigrant without citizenship (born in Austria, no Austrian citizenship), a ﬁrst generation
immigrant with citizenship (not born in Austria, Austrian citizenship) and ﬁrst generation immigrant
without citizenship (not born in Austria, no Austrian citizenship). It has to be said that we potentially
misclassify second or further generation immigrants who already gained Austrian citizenship as a native
Austrian. Therefore, our estimates of a higher divorce risk of mixed couples are potentially downward
biased.
16There is only one exception: the combination of a ﬁrst generation immigrant with Austrian citizenship
and a ﬁrst generation immigrant without an Austrian citizenship has a higher divorce risk than a native
Austrian couple.
10for whether the spouses where living together before marriage (information is available
since 1989). This pre-marital cohabitation itself is correlated with a lower risk of divorce
in the 1990s and with a higher risk in the 2000s, though the eﬀect of the latter is small.17
3.3 The impact of assortative mating over time
Due to our long data set, covering four decades, we can look at patterns and consequences
of assortative mating over time. It is a priori not clear whether the overall decrease in
homogamy should increase or decrease the penalty for a mixed religious or ethnic marriage
in terms of divorce risk. On the one hand, one could think that increased immigration and
sustained secularization has reduced the importance of ethnicity and religion in social life,
and one would expect a convergence of homogeneous and heterogeneous couples in terms of
marital stability. On the other hand, even given the increased incidence of mixed couples,
boundaries between religious and ethical groups may have stagnated or even increased
along other dimensions that aﬀect marital stability of these unions. Arguably, marital
stability is not only the result of the spouses’ interaction, but can also be inﬂuenced by
third parties, such as families or institutions. Moreover, the decrease in homogamy may
simple be the result of more opportunities to meet individuals outside the own group
(e.g. at school or at work), and not due to a substantial integration of diﬀerent groups.
Finally, the impact of assortative mating on divorce risk over time could change too due
to (unobserved) compositional eﬀects of heterogeneous (and/or homogeneous) couples.
For instance, spouses accounting for the ‘additional’ mixed marriages today, may have a
diﬀerent inherent divorce risk compared to those spouses who engaged in mixed marriages
in the past. In sum, it remains an empirical question if and how the overall decrease in
homogamy aﬀects the relative divorce hazard of mixed couples.
In general, there is little research on the stability of determinants of divorce over diﬀer-
ent marriage cohorts. Teachman (2002) analyzes marriages formed between 1950 and 1984
based on U.S. retrospective survey data, and ﬁnds that with the exception of race (con-
vergence of divorce hazards of whites and blacks), the eﬀects of major socio-demographic
predictors have not changed over time. De Graaf and Kalmijn (2006), also employing
retrospective survey data (Dutch marriage cohorts from 1942 through 1999), corroborate
the basic results of Teachman (2002). They ﬁnd in general no changes in divorce risk
factors over time; the only exception is educational attainment. The eﬀect of education
has changed from a positive to a negative eﬀect. However, the authors admit that larger
data-sets may be necessary to identify trends in determinants of divorce over time.
Our estimations, separately done for each decade, are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.
The results reveal that the stabilizing eﬀect of a higher age at the time of marriage has
somewhat decreased over time. While in the 1970s an increase in the wife’s age by one
year reduced the likelihood of divorce by 12:3 percent, the eﬀect decreased to 9:5 percent
in the 1990s and 10:3 percent in the 2000s. The optimal age diﬀerence between husband
17Svarer (2004) discuss whether this result is driven by self-selection or a true causal eﬀect.
11and wife for ﬁrst marriages decreased from 13:33 years in the 1970s to 9:83 years in the
2000s. Similar trends can be observed for further marriages. Given that Stevenson and
Wolfers (2007a) argue that production complementarities are less and less relevant for mar-
riage in the western world, and consumption complementarities and the insurance motive
gain importance, our ﬁndings could indicate that a higher age (diﬀerence) at marriage is
important to realize production complementarities, but it is less eﬃcient with respect to
consumption complementarities and risk sharing.
In terms of nationality, we ﬁnd that the destabilizing eﬀect of marriages between natives
and immigrants has tremendously increased over time, this applies both to ﬁrst as well as
further marriages and is particularly severe if a non-Austrian husband is involved. If the
wife is a foreign citizen, the couple faces a 17:4 percent higher divorce risk – as compared
to an Austrian couple – in the 1970s, this diﬀerence increases up to almost 50 percent for
marriages formed in the 2000s. Almost exactly the same trend is to be observed for further
marriages. If the husband is a foreign citizen, the couple’s divorce risk is 13:6 percent
higher as a native couple in the 1970s; the respective diﬀerence increases to close to 100
percent in the 2000s. The pattern is even stronger for further marriages. Several reasons
could explain this development. One obvious interpretation is that cultural assimilation of
foreign citizens – in particular men – in Austria is weak and gets worse over time. Before
jumping to such strong conclusions we have to make sure, that this pattern is not due
to structural changes over time. It might be that mixed-ethnic marriages in the 1970s
were formed with diﬀerent partners as in the 2000s. Looking at the evolution of mixed
marriages over time, we see that in the 1970s almost 40 percent of all mixed marriages
of Austrians were with ethnic-similar Germans and Swiss, who speak the same language.
Indeed, this share went down to about 11 percent after 2000. During this time, the share of
Austrian mixed marriages with immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Turkey increased
considerably. In the case of marriages between spouses who are both foreigner, we ﬁnd,
that their initially relatively low divorce risk is rising over time. Again, this can be partly
explained by compositional eﬀects: While in the 1970s almost 97 percent of these spouses
shared the same citizenship code, this rate dropped to less than 78 percent after 2000.
For mixed marriages in terms of religion, the pattern is less pronounced. For both,
ﬁrst and further marries, we observe a moderate increase in the relative divorce risk of all
three types of mixed couples. It seems that – though religious endogamy is declining – the
integration of diﬀerent religious denominations is still challenging. The relative divorce
risk of spouses without religious denomination is slightly decreasing for ﬁrst marriages and
quite stable for further marriages. The former eﬀect may reﬂect the attenuation of the
negative selection of this group due to an increasing secularization. For marriages between
spouses who both belong to another denomination, we ﬁnd, for ﬁrst marriages an increasing
marital stability, while in the case of further marriages, the eﬀect even changes sign.
In our more detailed results in Table 5 we see that couples with mixed immigration
background experienced the strongest increase in divorce hazards since the 1980s: The rel-
ative divorce risk of a native Austrian and a ﬁrst generation immigrant without Austrian
12citizenship increased by 40:0 percentage points. However, at the same time some conver-
gence of couples with a joint migration background (e.g. two ﬁrst generation immigrants
without Austrian citizenship, or a second and a ﬁrst generation immigrant, both without
Austrian citizenship) to Austrian couples in terms of higher levels of marital instability
can be observed.
Concerning previous joint children, we see a remarkable change over time: while in
the ﬁrst periods, the existence of pre-marital children was detrimental for marital stability
of ﬁrst marriages, this pattern has reversed later on. This result can be explained by
a changing process of self-selection. Traditionally, cohabitation and in particular out-of-
wedlock births have been deemed as morally wrong and were very uncommon in Austria.
Unmarried expectant parents, were usually – irrespective of the length of their relationship
or their match-quality – expected to marry before childbirth. That means, spouses with
pre-marital children used to be a very selective group, supposedly with non-traditional
family values and an inherent low marital stability. Over time, however, the incidence of
cohabitation (with or without subsequent marriage) has increased, and it became a more
and more accepted social institution, even in the presence of children. Accordingly, the
self-selection process in pre-marital births may have changed, the group with pre-marital
children has become less selective, and the correlation with non-traditional family values
should have attenuated over time. The stabilizing eﬀect of pre-marital children in the 2000s
can be explained by the (increasing) dominance of a true causal eﬀect of (pre-marital)
children on marital stability18 and/or other dimensions of self-selection. An example for
the latter is a correlation of the presence of pre-marital children with a high match-quality.
In the case of further marriages, pre-marital children have always been associated with
a considerably lower risk of divorce. However, comparable to ﬁrst marriages, we observe
that the stabilizing eﬀect grows in size over time. The initial diﬀerence between ﬁrst and
further marriages seems plausible, since the selections process is by deﬁnition diﬀerent in
both cases.
Our results are in line with other studies ﬁnding a diﬀerent eﬀect of male and female
children on the likelihood of divorce. The destabilizing eﬀect in the 1980s and in the
1990s was higher for girls compared to boys, and the stabilizing eﬀect in the 2000s more
pronounced for boys. The sex diﬀerence remains when we restrict our analysis to spouses
with only one pre-marital child, where we control for the sex of the ﬁrst-born child.19
Estimation results (not presented in the paper) show that the risk of divorce is slightly
higher if the ﬁrst-born child is female. The eﬀect is, however, not always statistically
signiﬁcant.
The higher baseline hazard of further marriages has decreased over time. While further
18Children are an example of an increase in marital-speciﬁc capital, which reduces the probability of
divorce, since such capital would be worth less in any other marriage or when being divorced (Becker,
Landes and Michael, 1977).
19Dahl and Moretti (2008) point out that the analysis of this question can only be applied to ﬁrst-born
children, since the sex of the ﬁrst child may inﬂuence subsequent fertility behavior, which may have an
independent eﬀect on the likelihood of divorce.
13marriages faced a 103:5 percent higher divorce risk – compared to ﬁrst marriages – in the
1970s, the eﬀect decreased to 79:8 percent in the 2000s.20 The most likely explanation
for this is again, a changing process of self-selection into re-marriage. As the share of the
number of divorced individuals on the (re)marriage market increased, the extent of their
negative selection decreased.
At this point it is worth emphasizing that increasing participation of divorced in the
(re)marriage market has no impact on the estimated decade eﬀects of ﬁrst or further
marriages. However, this development can explain part of the increase in conventionally
used divorce rates, since it measures the absolute number of cases per (adult) population.
A higher number of divorces in one year results in additional re-marriages in subsequent
years, which are again at risk of divorce. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the higher divorce
hazard of further marriages. Our simulations in Figure 5 abstract from the latter eﬀect
by presuming a divorce hazard of further marriages equal to that of ﬁrst marriages. The
resulting hypothetical divorce rates are signiﬁcantly lower than the actual ones starting in
the late 1980s.
3.4 Attitudes towards divorce
Our analysis so far has shown that the steady increase in divorce risk cannot be attributed
to changing assortative mating patterns over time. It must be due to changes in behavior,
most likely triggered by social changes. Divorce is nowadays a more acceptable way to
solve a marriage crisis as some decades ago.
One way to provide evidence for this supposition is given by survey data. Unfortunately,
we are not aware of any survey providing consistent information on the Austrian’s attitude
toward divorce over the whole time period under consideration. Still, the European and
World Values Survey (E/WVS) provides at least information on the attitude towards
divorce of Austrian respondents for the year 1990 and 1999. In particular, respondents are
asked to evaluate on a ten-point scale whether they think ‘divorce can always be justiﬁed,
never be justiﬁed, or something in between’. Figure 8 shows that from 1990 to 1999 divorce
became more acceptable among all sub-groups of the Austrian population. For married
respondents we observe an increase in the average score by 18:9 percent from 4:6 to 5:5.
At both points in time divorced respondents consider divorce to be more justiﬁable than
their married counterparts (1990: 7:2, 1999: 7:8), but the increase over time is relatively
smaller: plus 9:3 percent. The strongest increase (plus 24:4 percent) can be observed
among respondents with other family status (i.e. single, widowed, and separated persons).
This strong increase in the acceptance of divorce over time is robust when we control
for a number of socio-economic characteristics within a regression framework based on
individual data. The acceptance of divorce increases ceteris paribus by about 0:70 points
from 1990 to 1999, see Column (II) in Table 6. If we additionally include an indicator
for individual religiosity in Column (III) this eﬀect increases to about 0:75 points. For
20Detailed results are available upon request.
14Germany, which is culturally quite similar to Austria, the E/WVS provides data on the
same question starting already in 1981. An equivalent regression analysis for West Germany
shows that acceptance of divorce increases ceteris paribus by about 0:74 points from 1981
to 1990. This is a good indication that in Austria at least since the 1980s an increase in
the acceptance of divorce took place.
4 Conclusions
Several developments, such as increased economic independence of women, waves of im-
migration and ongoing secularization hit marriage markets in the western world over the
last decades and have altered assortative mating patterns considerably. Over the same
time period a sharp increase in divorce rates could be observed. Based on the universe of
all Austrian marriages since 1971 we have documented that changes in assortative mating
along the dimensions of age, ethnicity and religion are, however, not responsible for the
increased marital instability. Quite the contrary, without the rise in the age at marriage,
the incidence of divorce would have been even higher. Immigration, secularization, and
the resulting supply of spouses with diverse ethnicity and religious denominations had no
overall eﬀect on divorce rates, since countervailing eﬀects oﬀset each other. As a residual
explanation for the increase in marital stability, we suggest changing social norms. In-
deed, available survey data shows that the acceptance of divorce has increased among all
sub-groups of the population.
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a Number of divorces per 1;000 of the population 15 years of age or older. The ﬁgures for the
European countries are own calculations based on data from Eurostat. The ﬁgures for the United
States are own calculation based on data from several editions of the National Vital Statistics
Reports published by the National Center for Health Statistics and the Reading Survey of Epi-
demiology and End Results (SEER) U.S. County Population Data provided by the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimator for the duration of ﬁrst marriages by decades
19Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier estimator for the duration of further marriages by
decades
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a Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria.






















Actual rate Hypothetical rate (constant age) Hypothetical rate (equal hazard among first and further marriages)
a Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria.
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a Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria.
















Married (N=1,866) Divorced (N=145) Other (N=875)
1990
1999
a The ﬁgures are based on the following question from the European and World Values
Survey: Do you think ‘divorce can never be justiﬁed (1), always be justiﬁed (10), or something
in between’ evaluated on a ten-point scale.
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c
o
m
e
i
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
o
n
a
t
e
n
-
p
o
i
n
t
s
c
a
l
e
.
c
T
h
e
s
i
z
e
o
f
t
h
e
p
l
a
c
e
o
f
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
c
e
i
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
o
n
a
t
h
r
e
e
-
p
o
i
n
t
s
c
a
l
e
.
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